One of the most important Anglo-American philosophers of our time here joins the current philosophical debate about the nature of truth. William P. Alston formulates and defends a realist conception of truth, which he calls alethic realism (from aletheia , Greek for truth). This idea holds that the truth value of a statement (belief or proposition) depends on whether what the statement is about is as the statement says it is. Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam are two of the prominent and widely influential contemporary philosophers whose anti-realist ideas Alston attacks. Much in this book deserves agreement and applause; it is argued with care, subtlety, and good sense. ― The Journal of Philosophy Alston's book makes a distinguished contribution to thought about truth, both in its positive proposal and in its sustained criticism of epistemic conceptions.... His book is mandatory reading for anyone with even a slight interest in truth. ― The Philosophical Review From the standpoint of both general readers and professionals in the field this may be one of the best philosophical books to come along in some time.... The depth, the scope, and the clarity of Alston's analysis is matched only by that of the great philosophers with whom he contends. Highest recommendation for all collections. ― Choice This excellent, ludidly written study contains many valuable insights. ― Erkenntnis Easily the most penetrating and comprehensive analysis and critique of anti-realist theories of truth available, along with a vigorous defense of the realist account. With the publication of William Alston's book, the common dismissal of the correspondence theory of truth as outmoded has itself become outmoded! -- Nicholas Wolterstorff, Yale Divinity School One of the most important Anglo-American philosophers of our time here joins the current philosophical debate about the nature of truth with a work likely to claim a place at the very center of the contemporary philosophical literature on the subject. William P. Alston formulates and defends a realist conception of truth, which he calls alethic realism (from "aletheia", Greek for "truth"). This idea holds that the truth value of a statement (belief or proposition) depends on whether what the statement is about is as the statement says it is. Although this concept may seem quite obvious, Alston says, many thinkers hold views incompatible with it - and much of his book is devoted to a powerful critique of those views. Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam are two of the prominent and widely influential contemporary philosophers whose anti-realist ideas he attacks. Alston discusses different realist accounts of truth, examining what they do and do not imply. He distinguishes his version, which he characterizes as "minimalist", from various "deflationary" accounts, all of which deny that asserting the truth of a proposition attributes a property of truth to it. He also examines alethic realism in relation to a variety of metaphysical realisms. Finally, Alston argues for the importance - theoretical and practical - of assessing the truth value of statements, beliefs, and propositions. Alston discusses different realist accounts of truth, examining what they do and do not imply. He distinguishes his version, which he characterizes as 'minimalist, ' from various 'deflationary' accounts, all of which deny that asserting the truth of a proposition attributes a property of truth to it. William P. Alston is Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Syracuse University. He is the author of several books, including The Reliability of Sense Perception , also from Cornell. Used Book in Good Condition