The 1970 Cambodia Campaign know as the Cambodia Incursion was a series of military operations conducted in Eastern Cambodia by the United States and the government of South Vietnam. It's primary objective was to capture or eliminate forces of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Viet Cong (VC) which used this region as a base of operations against South Vietnam. After the Tet Offensive of 1968, the United States military feared another major coordinated offensive. The incursion was authorized by President Nixon at enormous political risk. It was made possible by a change in the Cambodian government when Prince Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown and replaced by the US backed general, Lon Nol. The Khrmer Royal Army (the Cambodian Army) and the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) conducted a series of joint operations inside Cambodia against the North Vietnamese after the North Vietnamese Cambodian offensive in late March, 1970 which captured and consolidated their hold on the border regions of Eastern Cambodia. Nixon saw this as an opportunity to expand operations into Cambodia on a limited basis denying the NVA of their border sanctuaries. President Lyndon Johnson had previously conducted covert military bombings of this region during his administration. Due to perceived expansion of the Vietnam War into Cambodia, opposition to the war grew enormously across the United States. Nixon's belief was that by eliminating these sanctuaries the enemy would be weakened and any major offensive by the NVA would be put off by a year or two. This would allow the United States to increase the withdrawal of American troops and enable the South Vietnamese to defend itself against a North Vietnamese takeover. Planning for the incursion was rapidly put into place. Intelligence about the region was sketchy at best. Clandestine cross border patrols were previously conducted by the Military Assistance Command Vietnam - Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG) but they were of little intelligence value. Maps of the region were almost non-existent and those maps that did exist were featureless expanses of green, uncharted areas. Another major obstruction was that the Eastern border region was devoid of any infrastructure. Roads and helicopter landing zones had to be constructed to facilitate all movement. There would be over seventy thousand American and South Vietnamese troops involved in the incursion. As a result, the logistical aspect of the incursion became equal to, and in many aspects, exceeded the military actions. Communications were stretched to the breaking point. Something as simple as separate radio frequencies for the individual units were in short supply. The Army found itself relaying messages from unit to unit. Relayed orders became garbled, confused and misinterpreted. Even with all these problems the incursion which began in June of 1970 was enormously successful. The North Vietnamese were unwilling to engage in major confrontation and fled west, deeper into Cambodia abandoning thousands of tons of weapons and supplies in locations spread all along the border. It was felt it would take over two years for the NVA to replace all these supplies and mount another major offensive giving Nixon the time to withdraw additional American troops and increase the Vietnamization of all subsequent military operations. It is in the chaotic early days of planning we begin our story.