In English, we use the word "I" to express thoughts that we have about ourselves, and we use the reflexive pronouns "himself" and "herself" to attribute such thoughts to others. Philosophers and linguists call such thoughts, and the statements we use to express them, de se .     De se thoughts and statements, although they appear often in our day-to-day lives, pose a series of challenging problems for both linguists and philosophers. This interdisciplinary volume examines the structure of  de se thought, various issues concerning the semantics and pragmatics of our discourse about it, and also what it reveals about how humans think about themselves and the world around them.   Contributors are: Darren Bradley Alessandro Capone Eros Corazza Wayne A. Davis Denis Delfitto Michael Devitt Igor Douven Neil Feit Gaetano Fiorin James Higginbotham Yan Huang Kasia M. Jaszczolt Michael Nelson Pietro Perconti John Perry Michael G. Titelbaum Neil Feit is chair of the Department of Philosophy at SUNY Fredonia and the author of Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content .   Alessandro Capone  teaches semantics at the University of Palermo.