This book uses a complex interdependence model to explain U.S. policy on international debt between 1981 and 1985. The author analyzes four cases: the administration's decision in early 1982 to pay interest due from Poland to U.S. banks on hundreds of millions of dollars in agricultural credits; the administration's actions to prevent a default by Mexico on its international debt; the decision by Reagan officials to support an increase of $8.4 billion in the U.S. share of the lending quota for the International Monetary Fund; and the 'Plan for Sustained Growth' designed to increase dramatically the amount of money lent to developing countries. The international debt crisis of the 1980s was a human disaster, an economic policy failure whose consequences still reverberate powerfully. James Joseph's sophisticated and lucid analysis contributes substantially toward a better understanding of thisunfortunate experience, and thus towards avoiding similar disasters in the future.>>> (Pollin, Robert) The international debt crisis of the 1980s was a human disaster, an economic policy failure whose consequences still reverberate powerfully. James Joseph's sophisticated and lucid analysis contributes substantially toward a better understanding of this unfortunate experience, and thus towards avoiding similar disasters in the future. (Pollin, Robert) James W. Joseph is Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Science at the University of Texas at Tyler.