This book is an English translation from the original Chinese white paper. In order to declare China’s defensive national defense policy in the new era, introduce China’s practice, purpose and significance of building and consolidating national defense and a strong military, and enhance the international community’s understanding of China’s national defense, the Chinese government published the white paper “China's National Defense in the New Era.” This white paper was released in 2019 and includes China’s announced defense spending up to 2018. China would have you believe the announced military budget for 2017 increased by 7 percent, to 1.044 trillion yuan ($151.43 billion), about one-quarter of the proposed U.S. defense spending for the year. However, that budget omits some significant cost items (described below). According to several sources, China’s publicly released military budget does not adequately reveal the enormous increase in spending in recent years of military-related items. For example, China’s 2022 military budget actually increased dramatically to $711 billion (estimated) — more than triple China’s claimed $229 billion and nearly equal with the U.S. military budget for that year. This is significant since the U.S. defense budget is based on world-wide military obligations. China’s defense budget is geared towards their local geographic area of responsibility. In years past, China released top line amounts for their budgets without details or explanation about what is included, other than listing three broad categories: equipment, training and maintenance, and personnel. According to Pentagon reports, China’s announced defense budget “omits several major categories of expenditures and its actual military-related spending is significantly higher.” The omissions include uncounted paramilitary organizations such as the People’s Armed Police (PAP), a paramilitary organization tasked with internal state security. The PAP augments the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in any military conflict. Another omission is China’s Coast Guard (a 150 ship navy) which operates in tandem with the PLA Navy. The budget also omits China’s space forces, military satellites and growing counter-space capabilities. In addition, many military functions are funded through civilian budgets such as military demobilization, retirement, pensions, military construction, arms imports, military research and development (R&D) programs, and dual-use technology investments. Civilian budgets also cover the cost of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), which can quickly mobilize if the need arises. All that said, the information presented in the White Paper needs to be examined carefully to separate fact from fiction. Note: In April 2024 Chinese leader Xi Jinping scrapped the Strategic Support Force (SSF) and in its place established the Information Support Force. Reportedly, the newly created Information Support Force will likely take charge of communications and network defense for the PLA. The creation of the Information Support Force as a new branch directly under the Central Military Commission underscores the importance of information dominance in modern warfare. A commentary in the PLA Daily described network information technology as “the biggest variable” in enhancing combat capability. “Modern wars are competitions between systems and structures, where control over information equates to control over the initiative in war,” it said. The emphasis on information dominance and “intelligentized warfare” also has significant implications for any potential future conflict in the Taiwan Strait.