How can citizens of a democracy exercise control over government officials in ways that allow for effective government? In this book, Professor Gruber merges a sophisticated analysis with empirical research to develop a new approach to this perennial problem. "The author treats the classic problem of achieving democratic control over powerful bureaucracies very successfully both by treating familiar material in a new and important way and by presenting new empirical evidence on the problem. . . . This is the most sophisticated and systematic work on the subject. . . . exceedingly well written—succinct, direct, and even graceful."—Dale Rogers Marshall, University of California, Davis "The author treats the classic problem of achieving democratic control over powerful bureaucracies very successfully both by treating familiar material in a new and important way and by presenting new empirical evidence on the problem. . . . This is the most sophisticated and systematic work on the subject. . . . exceedingly well written―succinct, direct, and even graceful."―Dale Rogers Marshall, University of California, Davis Judith Gruber is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. Controlling Bureaucracies: Dilemmas in Democratic Governance By Judith Gruber University of California Press Copyright © 1986 Judith Gruber All right reserved. ISBN: 0520056469 1 Controlling Bureaucracies We live in a democracy. That fact, taught in school and persistently reinforced by political oratory, is a source of pride and satisfaction to most of us. Although we often disagree about what a democracy entails, most people would probably accept the idea that the heart of a democratic political system is control of the government by the governed. In modern, complex democracies complete control is, of course, impossible, but at minimum we expect the popular election of public officials.1 Americans are particularly fond of using elections to keep public officials accountable. While the turnout for American elections is smaller than in many democracies, the number of officials we elect is large. We also live in an increasingly bureaucratized society. Large organizations—corporations, unions, merchandising chains—play a growing role in our lives. So, too, do large government agencies. Almost one-fifth of working people in this country are government employees, and in spite of our propensity for elections, only a tiny fraction Robert A. Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). of these are elected officials.2 The public official a citizen is most likely to encounter is not a legislator, mayor, governor, or president, but a bureaucrat—an IRS agent, an administrator in the motor vehicles bureau, a welfare worker, or an agricultural extension agent. As almost anyone can testify, these bureaucrats do much more than the proverbial paper pushing. They routinely make decisions that significantly affect the way government serves or regulates its citizens. Congress may pass the tax code, but an IRS agent decides whether a specific individual's expenses qualify as deductions. A state legislature may enact a program designed to improve the basic skills of students, but state administrators decide which particular programs and which particular schools are eligible for funds. A city council may pass a rent control ordinance, but local bureaucrats decide whether the improvements an individual landlord has made mean that rents for individual tenants may be raised. Although the impact of each of these decisions may be small, collectively they determine the texture of the relationship between citizens and government.3 Bureaucrats have not usurped this power from elected officials; they have been given it deliberately. Congress would be crippled if it had to decide on each citizen's taxes, as would city councils if they had to assess all rents. State legislators rarely have the expertise to evaluate individual educational programs. Elected officials have neither U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1982–3 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 394. Michael Lipsky argues that "there are many contexts in which the latitude of those charged with carrying out policy is so substantial that studies of implementation should be turned on their heads. In these cases policy is effectively 'made' by the people who implement it." (Lipsky, "Standing the Study of Public Policy Implementation on Its Head," in Walter Dean Burnham and Martha Wagner Weinberg, eds., American Politics and Public Policy [Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1978], p. 397). the time nor the specialized competence to make such decisions. These officials choose to delegate power to bureaucrats both for reasons of efficiency and to take advantage of the professional competence many bureaucrats possess. Yet the result of such del