Firms practice poaching of their rival¿s customers in markets where they are able to identify between their own customers and those of the rivals. This practice results in inefficiently high switching. In some of these markets firms also use strategies that make poaching by rival firms harder. Dr. Heisnam Singh explores the practice of firms requiring customers to sign contracts that are of pre-specified duration specifying early termination charges. If contract with breach penalty is available, firms find it privately optimal to use it. However when all firms use it they are worse off and results in lower than efficient switching. Consumers may be better off or worse off. Dr. Singh also examines the pricing decision of a typical firm that sells more than one product in markets where products are strategic complements and the firms have some market power. He find empirical evidence using data from the US wholesale market for unbranded gasoline that a firm internalizes the strategic complementarities when optimally choosing its prices.