In an age of new threats to international security, the old rules of war are rapidly being discarded. The great powers are moving toward norms less restrictive of intervention, preemption, and preventive war. This evolution is taking place not only in the United States but also in many of the world's most powerful nations, including Russia, France, and Japan, among others. As centuries of tradition and law are overturned, will preventive warfare push the world into chaos? Eve of Destruction is a provocative contribution to a growing international debate over the acceptance of preventive military action. In the first work to identify the trends that have led to a coming age of preventive war, Thomas M. Nichols uses historical analysis as well as interviews with military officials from around the world to trace the anticipatory use of force from the early 1990s—when the international community responded to a string of humanitarian crises in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo—to today's current and potential actions against rogue states and terrorists. He makes a case for a bold reform of U.S. foreign policy, and of the United Nations Security Council itself, in order to avert outright anarchy. "Nichols's grasp of diplomatic history, especially of recent diplomatic history, is sound, and his understanding of international relations theory and organizations is a strength of the work. Nichols develops and uses a variety of sources, including many from both foreign governments and press organs. His notes, in themselves, can be fascinating reading." -- John Broom, H-War Thomas M. Nichols is Professor of Strategy and Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy at the United States Naval War College. His previous books include The Russian Presidency and Winning the World: Lessons for America's Future from the Cold War. Chapter One A New Age of Prevention All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. —United Nations Charter, Article 2(4)I don't feel I have to wipe everybody out, Tom. Just my enemies. —Michael Corleone, The Godfather Part II A new age of prevention? The subject of preventive war is a difficult one, not least because it stirs a basic emotion in most people that it is simply wrong. Traditionally, the idea of using force based on a potential rather than actual threat has been viewed in the international community as morally offensive, akin to punishing an innocent person for a crime they might commit but have not. Discussing it in any but the most critical way seems almost to justify it, as it smacks of the gangster's lead-pipe approach to solving disputes and curbing the rise of rival dons. But it is a subject that must be explored as we enter a new age of violence and warfare. We live now in a world where many countries openly ponder whether preventive violence would serve their interests, with some (like the United States, Russia and France, among other examples) flatly defending the right to resort to such measures. It now seems that the norms of the 20th century are no longer going to govern the states of the 21st, and is time to consider the meaning of that change and what might be done in its wake. Actually, preventive war is not all that new a problem. Striking at potential foes before they can pose a greater threat is a temptation as old as human conflict itself, even if the idea of doing harm to others based on speculation about their motives was rarely considered either prudent or just. (The great Prussian statesman Otto von Bismarck famously referred to preventive war as "committing suicide for fear of death.") However, it was not until the early nineteenth century that the commonsense presupposition against preventive violence took on the moral force of an international norm that could govern relations between states, due to a largely, and understandably, forgotten incident in American history. In 1837, British militia in Canada destroyed an American merchant ship, the Caroline , that had been aiding anti-British rebels across the Canadian border. The ship was burned and tossed over Niagara Falls; one American was killed during the raid. The consequent dispute between Washington and London produced not only a British apology, but a more formal understanding of the limits of violence in international affairs. As U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster would put it some years later, henceforth the resort to violence in self-defense would be judged by whether it was motivated by a necessity that was "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." This famous formulation, the yardstick by which the legitimacy of military action would be measured, became known in international legal usage as "the Caroline test." It is arguable whether Webster's reasoning had m