This important book draws on vital new archival material to unravel the mystery of Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941 and Stalin's enigmatic behavior on the eve of the attack. Challenging the currently popular view that Stalin was about to invade Germany when Hitler made a preemptive strike, Gorodetsky argues that Stalin was actually negotiating for peace in order to redress the European balance of power. The latest work from Gorodetsky (history, Tel Aviv Univ.; Stafford Cripp's Mission to Moscow, 1940-42) approaches the 1940-42 period in an exhaustive detail that has never before been possible. Making extensive use of recently opened Russian archives, Gorodetsky reexamines the events surrounding Hitler's 1941 invasion of Russia. Drawing on the files of the Russian foreign ministry, the general staff, the security forces, and personal diaries, he gives as complete a picture as possible of this most tumultuous time, giving the reader new insights into the war's tense negotiations and key players' political motivations. This book will dispel many of the long-held myths about the start of history's most written-about war. No historical collection can afford to be without this book; highly recommended for both academic and public libraries.AMark E. Ellis, Albany State Univ., GA Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc. Stalin's role and motives in the Molotov Ribbentrop nonaggression pact and the subsequent German invasion of the Soviet Union remain a subject of dispute among diplomatic historians. Gorodetsky, a professor of Russian and East European History at Tel Aviv University, has utilized newly available material from Soviet archives to reach a sensible, if noncontroversial, conclusion. He rejects the currently fashionable view that Stalin had his own plans to invade Germany, "forcing" Hitler into a preemptive strike. He also rejects the "Stalin as victim" thesis, which suggests that Stalin forged the pact with Hitler only after his desperate efforts to form a united front with Britain and France were rebuffed. Rather, Gorodetsky marshals considerable evidence to show Stalin as pragmatic, cynical, and wholly devoted to advancing the Soviet Union's national interest, with little regard for the world revolution. Of course, Stalin's deep, almost pathological suspicion of Britain and France is quite evident. Conversely, his "trust" in Hitler as a fellow rogue with whom he could negotiate was a tragic delusion. Jay Freeman An intense, and densely written, study of the strategic and diplomatic reasons for the German invasion of Russia in WWII and of why Stalin wasnt better prepared to defend the country. Gorodetsky (East European History/Tel Aviv University, Israel) draws on a wealth of Soviet materials previously unavailable, as well as on material from German and British archives, to argue that this lack of preparation until just weeks before Germany launched its attack was not motivated by political navet but rather by Stalins own brand of realpolitika hope for European peace on terms dictated by Germany, terms in which Stalin would have a part, as an ally of Hitlers through the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Gorodetsky looks carefully at the various corespondences and examines the aims that blinded Stalin to the dangers that were building as Germany deployed its troops closer and closer to the Russian border. In addition, Gorodetsky also examines the effect that the Stalinist purges of the 1930s had in Russias attempts to formulate a strategic response to the German buildup of troops without provoking the Wehrmacht into further action. Gorodetskys arguments are clear once the reader has managed to unearth them from the mounds of dense, jargon-filled prose in which they are buried. There are few sentences shorter then a full paragraph, and the book is more than twice as long as it needs be. Gorodetskys concluding chapter, a concise 7 pages, sums up all the 300 pages that precede it. Alas for the reader that this chapter comes at the books end rather than at its beginning. Well argued . . . and argued and argued. -- Copyright ©1999, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved. ... Gorodetsky's book is a landmark in establishing a convincing historical interpretation. Based on prodigious archival research, its forte is to bring the evidence from hitherto inaccessible Soviet sources to bear upon many disputed points in this story. In particular, the book examines the theory that Stalin did have a covert Plan B, and that this amounted to a revolutionary war against Germany. On this reading, Hitler's sneak attack of June 1941 so shocked Stalin because he himself had been planning a sneak attack in July. Gorodetsky will have none of this. With relentless documentary overkill, he explodes such ideas as fanciful... None of these perspectives can survive Gorodetsky's cool and meticulous examination. -- Peter Clarke, The Sunday Times, London, 1 August, 1999 Gabriel Gorodetsky is a distinguished Israeli historian