Death comes for us all – eventually. Philosophers have long been perplexed by how we ought to feel about death. Many people fear death and believe that death is bad for the person who dies. But is death bad for us, and if so, how is its badness best explained? If we do not survive death –if death is simply a state of nothingness – how can death be bad for us? If death is bad for us, do we have good reason to live as long as possible? Would an immortal life really be a good human life – or would even an immortal life eventually become tedious and make us long for mortality? This volume presents fourteen philosophical essays that examine our attitudes toward mortality and immortality. The topics addressed have become more urgent as scientists attempt to extend the human lifespan, perhaps even indefinitely. This book invites the reader to critically appraise his or her own attitudes toward death and immortality by exploring the ethical, metaphysical, and psychological complexities associated with these issues. “This new collection of essays considers whether and when death is bad for those who die, as well as whether and when it would be good to live forever. The collection will be of great value to anyone who thinks seriously about mortality, and is a welcome addition to the literature on the philosophy of death.” ―Steven Luper, Murchison Term Professor, and Philosophy Department Chair, Trinity University “This is a wonderful collection of original contributions on cutting-edge topics and literature of great human interest, with a helpful introductory essay.” ―John Fischer, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside “That the essays in this volume have stimulated so many questions in this short review should be taken as a testament to their interest -- and hence to the excellence of this volume as a whole […] Immortality and the Philosophy of Death is an extremely valuable addition to the philosophical literature on these fascinating issues.” ― Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Michael Cholbi is Professor of Philosophy at California State Polytechnic University Pomona. Immortality and the Philosophy of Death By Michael Cholbi Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd Copyright © 2016 Michael Cholbi All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-1-78348-384-6 Contents Introduction, PART I: IS DEATH BAD FOR THOSE THAT DIE?, 1 Victims Christopher Belshaw, 2 Reconsidering Categorical Desire Views Travis Timmerman, 3 Epicureanism, Extrinsic Badness, and Prudence Karl Ekendahl and Jens Johansson, 4 Lucretius and the Fear of Death Frederik Kaufman, 5 The Harms of Death Duncan Purves, 6 Seeds: On Personal Identity and the Resurrection Sophie-Grace Chappell, PART II: LIVING WITH DEATH, 7 Fearing Death as Fearing the Loss of One's Life: Lessons from Alzheimer's Disease David Beglin, 8 Constructing Death as a Form of Failure: Addressing Mortality in a Neoliberal Age Beverley Clack, 9 Love and Death Dan Werner, 10 Learning to be Dead: The Narrative Problem of Mortality Kathy Behrendt, 11 Love and Death: The Problem of Resilience Aaron Smuts, PART III: THE VALUE OF AN IMMORTAL LIFE, 12 Immortality, Identity, and Desirability Roman Altshuler, 13 Resources for Overcoming the Boredom of Immortality in Fischer and Kierkegaard Adam Buben, 14 Immortality and the Exhaustibility of Value Michael Cholbi, Index, About the Contributors, CHAPTER 1 Victims Christopher Belshaw When is death bad for the one who dies? Not as often as you might think. It is typically bad for the likes of us — the people reading this — and for our friends, neighbors, colleagues, students. It is similarly typically bad for similar people elsewhere. But it isn't bad for nonhuman animals or for a human zygote, or embryo, or fetus. Nor, more controversially, is it bad for neonates, or young babies. Nor, a little less controversially, is it bad for many in an end-of-life situation, for the brain dead, or someone in PVS, or with advanced Alzheimers. What more can be said about those for whom death is bad? Most of us are familiar with the term "person" used in a Lockean sense to pick out those beings that are rational, self-conscious, and have an understanding of time. While some have objections, often on grounds of its alleged ethical implications, most, I think, are content to so use the term. And I assume here that such usage is acceptable. So my claim can be put in terms of personhood. Death is often (but not always) bad for persons. It isn't bad (ever) for non-persons. And now in explaining why this should be so there emerges a different, though related, account of death's badness. Not only can persons, and they alone, have beliefs about times other than now, but they, and they alone, can have desires relating to those times, wishing that such and such had happened in the past, hoping that this and that will happen in the future. And they can hope that they themselves will survive into the fu