Anthony de Jasay breaks new ground with Justice and Its Surroundings ―a collection of trenchant essays that seek to redefine the concept of justice and to highlight the frontier between it and the surrounding issues that encroach upon it and are mistakenly associated with it. This straightforward and terse book analyzes the roles of collective choice, redistribution, and socialism and the claims that would enlist justice in their service. Anthony de Jasay is an independent theorist living in France. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Monday 10 November 2003, No. 261, p. 12 Translated by L. Dan Kirklin Justice and Injustice Anthony de Jasay does away with intellectual confusions Anthony de Jasay: Justice and Its Surroundings. Liberty Fund, Indianapolis 2002, 321 pp., $10.00. Anthony de Jasay is one of the most interesting political philosophers of the twentieth century. He studied in Australia, taught at Oxford University, was then an investment banker, and is now an unaffiliated scholar in France. The American Nobel Prize-winner James Buchanan wrote of Jasay's first book, The State, that it was a revelation for him. Despite having in the meantime published a whole row of books, in this country he is still considered something of a hot-tipster. If one wanted to characterize Jasay by means of an Anglo-Saxon label, then "libertarian conventionalist" might recommend itself: an economist of the Austrian School, with however a grounding in solid epistemological theory, in opposition to the apriorism [could be tr. "rationalism"] of the followers of Ludwig von Mises. He is a "Libertarian," since he proceeds on the assumption that the individual is in principle free to carry out a particular action, so long as there is no valid objection to this action, and that the burden of proof lies upon the opposition, that is, upon those who maintain there are valid objections. And he is a "Conventionalist" in the sense that he considers a social order that is founded on contractual convention and reputation (justified ["reasonable"] confidence ["trust," "faith"]) to be a practical alternative to the State. Jasay's logic is flawless, his style masterful. The title of the newest book describes exactly what it is about. The central essays, which concern themselves with justice ["fairness"], are surrounded by essays in which Jasay investigates the surroundings of justice: topics which intrude into discussions of justice and which are often confused with genuine problems of justice. Thus the author treats the State in the first part--and indeed under the programmatic heading "The Needless State." Jasay confirms Edmund Burke's dictum "Politics in itself is abuse ["misuse"]." From this follows the maxim: to keep the political sphere as small as possible. In the second part the author deals with Redistribution (governmental, compulsory) and from there proceeds to the central essay, "Justice." This is followed by the fourth part, "Socialism," and then the fifth, "Freedom." In the chapter on justice Jasay makes the suggestion that the ambiguous and vague concept ["idea," "notion"] [i.e. of justice] of ordinary speech and politics be replaced with a concept that represents a better intellectual instrument for rational discussions. Because the colloquial usage of "justice" is a classic example of the political use of language and is thus accordingly confused, Jasay falls back on the philosophical discussion. Individual actions are judged by the attribute "just/unjust." Two principles serve as a leitmotifs: the aristotelean "to each his own" and "equal cases, equal treatment." The connection between action and consequence (reward or sanction), between freedom of action and responsibility, stands in the foreground. The individual is responsible for his activity. The principle "to each his own" chimes for example when we ask, say, in the case of the chairman of a firm: "Does he earn what he earns?" (Does he deserve what he earns?) The second principle is indispensable for rational expectations and thus for the stability of a society. But what makes two cases "equal"? Jasay demonstrates that the problem is that of legitimizaing the criteria for the claim that two cases are, in relevant hindsight, equal. The chapter preceding the central essay cleans up the messiness of the intellectual environment of the concept of "justice" and with the many suggestive definitions of the expression "just" justice as something else than justice--as for instance justice as "fairness" (according to John Rawls), justice as nonrejectability (according to Thomas Scanlon), justice as impartiality (according to Brian Barry). In Germany Rawls' theory enjoys ever greater popularity with, among others, economists. Its substantial content corresponds to the Social Democratic climate--in all parties. The reception of Rawls' theory is typical for a place in which "justice" operates in the social environment. The expression "just" is now no longer applie