“An impressive source book on the conflict, high on information and data.”— Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research September 7, 1812, is by itself one of the most cataclysmic days in the history of war: 74,000 casualties at the Battle of Borodino. And this was well before the invention of weaspons of mass destruction like machine guns or breech-loading rifles. In this detailed study of one of the most fascinating military campaigns in history, George Nazfiger includes a clear exposition on the power structure in Europe at the time leading up to Napoleon’s fateful decision to attempt what turned out to be impossible: the conquest of Russia. Also featured are complete orders of battle and detailed descriptions of the opposing forces. Napoleon scholar Nafziger details one of the bloodiest campaigns of world history in this 1988 title. In addition to a hefty text, this also offers numerous maps and appendixes that include everything from treaties, political documents, and orders of battle for the numerous units to lists of supplies, the numbers of troops and their locations, and more. A truly exhaustive reference. Copyright 1998 Reed Business Information, Inc. The causes of the 1812 campaign can be said to have had their roots in the military rivalry between France and Russia and the economic rivalry between France and England, but the first shots of this campaign are found in a series of decrees issued in 1806 that gave birth to what was known as the “Continental System.” England and France were fighting for the economic domination of Europe.   The term “Continental System” was coined by Napoleon to describe the system by which he intended to defeat England after his efforts to defeat the British navy on the high seas had failed. England was not a self-sufficient country and depended on both its imports of raw materials and its continental markets for its existence. Napoleon hoped that by cutting off these markets he could ruin the British economy and force the British to submit to his will. In addition, Napoleon had the second goal of forcing the Continental states into a total economic dependence on the industrial exports of France, which would give him an economical dominance to match his military dominance of Europe.   Napoleon hoped that he could pursue these goals with the cooperation and approval of his Continental allies. He spent much time condemning Britain's maritime policies, such as the exclusion of non-British products from Britain's colonies and Britain's seizure of the colonies of many of the Continental states. Napoleon postured and posed as the defender of the Continental interests against an unprincipled Britain.   The institution of the Continental System began with the British declaration that the entire coast of the Continent from Brest to the Elbe was in a state of blockade. This was instituted on 16 May 1806. In retaliation. Napoleon closed the entire north German coast of Friesland to British goods.   This situation remained unchanged until late 1806, when the Prussians were beaten by Napoleon. When Prussia ceased to be a military threat to Napoleon, he proceeded to seal off the major commercial cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck. This provided a “hermetic seal” against British goods on the Atlantic coast of Germany. He also began the process of seizing all of the British goods that were to be found in those territories. The significance of this move was great because those cities were the principal conduits by which Britain shipped her goods into Europe.   The immediate result of these orders was the seizure of massive quantities of British goods and the enrichment of Napoleon's war treasury. Napoleon's next step was the issuance of the famous Berlin Decrees on 12 November 1806. The preamble of the decree denounced the British blockade of 16 May as a violation of recognized international law. The text of the decree stated that the British Isles were, themselves, in a state of blockade, forbade all trade in British goods, ordered the arrest of all British subjects in allied states, made all British goods liable to seizure, and refused port access to any vessel coming directly from Britain or any of her colonies, or that had called on one of those ports since the issuance of the decree.   The decree applied to all of France's allies and, in theory, formed a counterblockade against British financial incursion extending from north-em Germany to Italy, excluding Portugal. Lacking a fleet, Napoleon was unable to actually enforce his blockade of Britain, so the results of this decree were felt principally by the neutrals engaged in commerce, who ran the risk of capture by French privateers.   Those Continental states that were not allies also felt pressure to comply with the decree. Napoleon's victorious armies provided a strong incentive, often stronger than the state's desire for British trade.   Napoleon's aim was to expand the economic isolation of Bri