Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed depleted-uranium (DU) contamination of Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Abrams Tanks during the Persian Gulf War, focusing on: (1) U.S. soldiers' exposure to DU; (2) Army guidance and training on the proper handling and risks of DU and ways to minimize DU exposure; (3) Army medical evaluations for personnel exposed to DU radiation; and (4) the effectiveness of Army decontamination and disposal of DU-contaminated combat vehicles. GAO found that: (1) the Army does not know the full extent of DU radiation exposure during the war, but several dozen or more soldiers were exposed to DU primarily through inhalation, ingestion, or shrapnel; (2) the Army and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission believed that combat personnel were not exposed to radiation levels that exceeded acceptable exposure limits; (3) DU protective methods may be inadequate during combat and life-threatening situations; (4) the Army did not sufficiently educate its personnel and disseminate information concerning the hazards of DU exposure; (5) DU educational training was limited to Abrams tank personnel, munitions handlers, and explosive ordnance disposal personnel; (6) the Army and the Department of Veterans Affairs have begun testing injured Army National Guard personnel and Abrams and Bradley crew members who could have been exposed to DU radiation; (7) the Army lacked adequate plans for evaluating other personnel who could have been exposed to DU, including those involved with DU-contaminated vehicle recovery; and (8) the Army had inadequate facilities and no formal procedures to decontaminate, dispose of, or quickly repair DU-contaminated vehicles.