In this revised edition of his 1979 classic Political Theory and International Relations , Charles Beitz rejects two highly influential conceptions of international theory as empirically inaccurate and theoretically misleading. In one, international relations is a Hobbesian state of nature in which moral judgments are entirely inappropriate, and in the other, states are analogous to persons in domestic society in having rights of autonomy that insulate them from external moral assessment and political interference. Beitz postulates that a theory of international politics should include a revised principle of state autonomy based on the justice of a state's domestic institutions, and a principle of international distributive justice to establish a fair division of resources and wealth among persons situated in diverse national societies. "[Beitz] has succeeded in clarifying the agenda of moral debate concerning the relations of states and of their inhabitants." ---Terry Nardin, American Political Science Review " Political Theory and International Relations is a fine piece of philosophical criticism and reconstruction that few established philosophers could have written.... This is a first-rate book on an issue as fundamental as it is neglected." ---Henry Shue, Ethics "This important book deals a deadly blow to the facile assumptions that support the widespread belief that moral judgment is fundamentally inapplicable or inappropriate in matters of foreign policy and international relations." ---David V. Edwards, Social Science Quarterly In this revised edition of his 1979 classic Political Theory and International Relations, Charles Beitz rejects two highly influential conceptions of international theory as empirically inaccurate and theoretically misleading. In one, international relations is a Hobbesian state of nature in which moral judgments are entirely inappropriate, and in the other, states are analogous to persons in domestic society in having rights of autonomy that insulate them from external moral assessment and political interference. Beitz postulates that a theory of international politics should include a revised principle of state autonomy based on the justice of a state's domestic institutions, and a principle of international distributive justice to establish a fair division of resources and wealth among persons situated in diverse national societies. Charles R. Beitz is Professor of Government at Bowdoin College. His other books include Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory and International Ethics: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader, which he coedited with Marshall Cohen (both books are available from Princeton). Political Theory and International Relations By Charles R. Beitz PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS Copyright © 1999 Princeton University Press All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-0-691-00915-5 Contents Preface, vii, Introduction, 3, Part One. International Relations as a State of Nature, 11, 1. The Skepticism of the Realists, 15, 2. The Hobbesian Situation, 27, 3. International Relations as a State of Nature, 35, 4. The Basis of International Morality, 50, 5. From International Skepticism to the Morality of States, 63, Part Two. The Autonomy of States, 67, 1. State Autonomy and Individual Liberty, 71, 2. Nonintervention, Paternalism, and Neutrality, 83, 3. Self-determination, 92, 4. Eligibility, Boundaries, and Nationality, 105, 5. Economic Dependence, 116, 6. State Autonomy and Domestic Social Justice, 121, Part Three. International Distributive Justice, 125, 1. Social Cooperation, Boundaries, and the Basis of Justice, 129, 2. Entitlements to Natural Resources, 136, 3. Interdependence and Global Distributive Justice, 143, 4. Contrasts between International and Domestic Society, 154, 5. The Rights of States, 161, 6. Applications to the Nonideal World, 169, Conclusion, 177, Afterword, 185, Works Cited, 221, Index, 237, CHAPTER 1 The Skepticism of the Realists For many years, it has been impossible to make moral arguments about international relations to its American students without encountering the claim that moral judgments have no place in discussions of international affairs or foreign policy. This claim is one of the foundations of the so-called realist approach to international studies and foreign policy. On the surface, it is a most implausible view, especially in a culture conscious of itself as an attempt to realize a certain moral ideal in its domestic political life. All the more remarkable is the fact that the realists' skepticism about the possibility of international moral norms has attained the status of a professional orthodoxy in both academic and policy circles, accepted by people with strong moral commitments about other matters of public policy. Although the realists have often used arguments with deep roots in modern political theory, I believe that their skepticism can be shown to rest