Of special focus in this reflective overview of Wesley's theological convictions is highlighting the practical-theological dynamics of Wesley's work and suggesting possible implications for contemporary attempts to recover theology as a practical discipline. Another distinctive focus of this work is a systematic consideration of the integration of theological emphases traditionally divergent in Eastern and Western Christianity. The author also closely examines the consistency of Wesley's thought throughout his career. Randy L. Maddox is William Kellon Quick Professor Emeritus of Wesleyan and Methodist Studies at Duke Divinity School in Durham, NC, and general editor of the Bicentennial Edition of The Works of John Wesley. Responsible Grace John Wesley's Practical Theology By Randy L. Maddox Abingdon Press Copyright © 1994 Abingdon Press All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-0-687-00334-1 Contents Acknowledgments, Introduction, Chapter 1: Human Knowledge of the God of Responsible Grace, Chapter 2: The God of Responsible Grace, Chapter 3: Humanity's Need and God's Initial Restoring Grace, Chapter 4: Christ—The Initiative of Responsible Grace, Chapter 5: Holy Spirit—The Presence of Responsible Grace, Chapter 6: Grace and Response—The Nature of Human Salvation, Chapter 7: The Way of Salvation—Grace Upon Grace, Chapter 8: The Means of Grace and Response, Chapter 9: The Triumph of Responsible Grace, Concluding Reflections, Notes, Selected Bibliography, Index of Selected Names, Index of Selected Subjects, CHAPTER 1 Human Knowledge of the God of Responsible Grace Whenever Christians articulate, inculcate, reformulate, or defend primary theological convictions, they operate (implicitly or explicitly) with assumptions about where one can obtain reliable input regarding these issues and how one should draw upon this input to insure truly Christian convictions. That is, they operate with assumptions about the manner of revelation and the criteria of doctrinal decisions. This chapter will assess Wesley's assumptions about these "meta-theological" issues. An initial caveat is in order. I have chosen to discuss these issues prior to consideration of Wesley's theological worldview only because it provides a helpful context for understanding some of his doctrinal decisions. I am not meaning to imply that Wesley developed explicit stances on these issues prior to engaging in doctrinal reflection. He was not subject to the "paralysis of analysis" that plagues modern theologians, leaving them hesitant to engage in actual doctrinal reflection until they have solved all methodological puzzles. Indeed, Wesley seldom provided extended articulations of his methodological assumptions. He postulated them in passing, or exemplified them in the process of actual theological activity. I will be gathering these scattered insights, while watching for any developments or tensions. The Fount of Knowledge—God's Gracious Self-Revelation One set of meta-theological assumptions concerns the sources of theological knowledge. How and where can we have access to knowledge about God and God's will for us? The best way to approach Wesley's answer to this question is in light of his general epistemological commitments. Excursus: Wesley's Epistemology Discussions of epistemology, which inquires into the sources of human knowledge, had divided into two major camps in the Western intellectual traditions by Wesley's time. The rationalist camp (hailing back to Plato) stressed the role of reason in providing the most important knowledge, particularly through innate ideas—ideas resident in our minds prior to any experience. By contrast, empiricists (championing Aristotle) denied that there were innate ideas, arguing that experience was the source of all foundational human knowledge. Where did Wesley fit in this debate? The issue of Wesley's epistemological commitments has attracted considerable scholarly interest recently. What has become clear through this study is that Wesley self-consciously sided with the empiricist denial of innate ideas. He frequently quoted the slogan nihil est in intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu, "nothing is in the mind that is not first in the senses". He embraced the Aristotelian logical tradition at Oxford. He commented favorably on John Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, and he appended an abridgement of Peter Browne's The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of Human Understanding to his compendium of natural philosophy. This is not to say that Wesley agreed totally with (then current) Lockean empiricism. He dissented from this tradition in two significant ways. In the first place, Wesley was epistemologically more optimistic than Locke. He considered Locke much too prone to believe that our senses could mislead us, or that the abstractions which our minds form based on our experience might not correspond to the way things really are. Wesley's second divergence from contemporary e