Most scholars believe that China’s nationality policy, like that of other socialist states, imitated the Soviet nationality model, a system which has been termed an “affirmative action empire.” This book offers two contributions to the literature which run counter to this convention. First, it argues that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union (USSR) were different; while the PRC was aimed to build an ideal-typical nation-state, the USSR was an open union of nation-states that was only temporarily confined to a physical territory. Second, while scholars who have noted this difference attribute it to contextual factors, such as ethnic structure, geopolitical status, and Russia’s intervention into the Chinese Revolution, this book contends that context shaped the Sino-Soviet difference, yet it did not determine it. Rather, there was significant leeway between the implications of the contextual factors, and what the policy-designers ultimately established. This book probes who held agency, and how these individuals bridged this gap. CHOICE Recommended: Graduate students, faculty and professionals. -- W.G. Moss, emeritus, Eastern Michigan University The twentieth century saw the decline of traditional empires, yet some endured by adapting. This book compares how Russia and China navigated these transformations, each harnessing nationalism through communist revolution. While Bolsheviks restructured the Tsarist empire into a union of distinct nation-states, Chinese revolutionaries reintegrated Qing territories into a unified state with autonomous regions. Despite this divergence, both revolutions were shaped by their leaders’ strategic choices. Compared to the USSR’s founding Bolsheviks, the Chinese communists were more ethnically homogeneous but less internationalist, seeking a self-contained polity rather than an expanding union. Unlike the Bolsheviks, who dissolved Russia into the Soviet framework, the Chinese communists preserved China while embedding revolutionary ideals. Their prolonged struggle taught them to reconcile tradition with ideology and shaped their cautious approach to borderlands. Lacking the strength to dominate frontier regions, they rejected the Bolshevik strategy of weaponizing national self-determination. This book explores the key features of China’s communist revolution and their role in the country’s transition to a nation-state: geographical isolation from external interference, bottom-up mobilization over a protracted struggle, and the enduring challenge of being the weaker side in conflict. It will be invaluable to scholars of revolution, empire, comparative historical sociology, and communist leadership in Russia and China. Luyang Zhou is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Zhejiang University