This monograph offers a neo-classically republican perspective on a perennial problem of civilian/military relations: limitations on military officers' obligation to obey civilian authorities. All commentators agree that military officers are generally obliged-morally, professionally, and legally-to obey civilian orders, even as they agree that this rule of obedience must admit of exceptions. Commentators tend to differ, however, on the basis and breadth of these exceptions. Following Samuel Huntington's classic analysis in The Soldier and the State, this monograph shows that disagreement about the breadth of the exceptions tends to assume that their bases-moral, professional, and legal-are incommensurable. It suggests, to the contrary, that all defensible exceptions to the rule of military obedience, like that rule itself, derive from a single neo-classical, Huntingtonian standard, binding on civilian authorities and military officers alike: the common good. This perspective promises significantly to reduce the range of disagreement over the limits of military obedience both in theory and in practice. Audience: This monograph may appeal to military, corporate leaders, and officers as well as those carrying out a mission for the common good. This work reviews the neo-classical and historical Huntingtonian standard that binds civilian authorities with military officers for the common good. Readers should gain a deeper foundation of both the American constitutional law and neo-classical political theory basis for an understanding of the common good mission benefits. Students researching materials in subjects such as neoclassical theory, political theory, global political economy, philosophy, laws of democracy, and constitutional law classes may be interested in this work as a supplemental text for writing essays and term papers.