Property rights are the rules governing ownership in society. This Element offers an analytical framework to understand the origins and consequences of property rights. It conceptualizes of the political economy of property rights as a concern with the follow questions: What explains the origins of economic and legal property rights? What are the consequences of different property rights institutions for wealth creation, conservation, and political order? Why do property institutions change? Why do legal reforms relating to property rights such as land redistribution and legal titling improve livelihoods in some contexts but not others? In analyzing property rights, the authors emphasize the complementarity of insights from a diversity of disciplinary perspectives, including Austrian economics, public choice, and institutional economics, including the Bloomington School of institutional analysis and political economy. ‘A relatively rare book about executive authority that is effectively behavioralist and centered on political culture and mass opinion. But that approach links cleanly back to institutional behavior: the incentives individual presidents have to act in various ways and the accountability they face for doing so. It is an impressive achievement that lays down a lasting marker on a topic of massive importance.’ Andrew Rudalevige, Congress & the Presidency This Element uses Austrian economics, public choice, and institutional economics to explain the origins and consequences of property rights.