A new translation by Peter Constantine Introduction by Albert Russell Ascoli   The first modern treatise of political philosophy, The Prince is one of the world’s most influential and widely read books. Machiavelli reveals nothing less than the secrets of power: how to gain it, how to wield it, and how to keep it. Ruthless, cunning, and amoral, The Prince is a controversial analysis of manipulation and an essential guide for anyone interested in conquest, self-defense, or observation of dominance and control. The Introduction by noted Italian Renaissance scholar Albert Russell Ascoli provides a perfect opening to Peter Constantine’s illuminating new translation of this seminal work.   “Constantine elegantly captures in English the pith of Machiavelli’s brilliant Italian prose.”—Edward Muir, Clarence L. Ver Steeg Professor in the Arts and Sciences, Northwestern University “Constantine elegantly captures in English the pith of Machiavelli’s brilliant Italian prose.”—Edward Muir, Clarence L. Ver Steeg Professor in the Arts and Sciences, Northwestern University Peter Constantine , winner of the PEN Translation Prize and a National Translation Award, has earned wide acclaim for his translation of The Undiscovered Chekhov and of the complete works of Isaac Babel, as well as for his Modern Library translations, which include The Essential Writings of Machiavelli, Gogol’s Taras Bulba, Voltaire’s Candide, and Tolstoy’s The Cossacks .   Albert Russell Ascoli is Gladys Arata Terrill Distinguished Professor of Italian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and was awarded the Rome Prize for study at the American Academy in Rome. Chapter 1 The Prince The Kinds of Principalities and the Means by Which They Are Acquired All states and all dominions that hold and have held power over men have been and are either republics or principalities. Principalities are either hereditary, in which case the family of the ruler has long been in power, or they are new. The new ones are either entirely new, as Milan was to Francesco Sforza,1 or they are, so to speak, members added to the hereditary possession of the prince who acquires them, as the Kingdom of Naples is to the King of Spain.2 The dominions thus acquired have been accustomed either to live under a prince or to be free; and they are acquired either by fortune or by ability.3 Chapter 2 Hereditary Principalities I shall exclude any discussion of republics, having discussed them at length elsewhere.1 I shall consider principalities alone and, following the indicated plan, shall discuss how they may be governed and preserved. I say, then, that hereditary states accustomed to the family of their ruler are more easily kept than new ones, because it is sufficient if the prince does not abandon the methods of his ancestors and proves adaptable when unforeseen events occur. In this way a prince of ordinary capability will always keep his state unless he is deprived of it by an exceptional or exceedingly powerful force. If he is once deprived of it, however, he will nevertheless regain it at the slightest adversity that the conqueror encounters. In Italy we have the example of the Duke of Ferrara, who was able to sustain the assaults of the Venetians in 1484 and those of Pope Julius in 1510 for no other reason than that he had been long established in that dominion.2 The hereditary prince has less cause and less need to offend than a new one. Hence it follows that he is more readily loved. If unusual vices do not make him hated, it is reasonable to suppose that his subjects will feel a natural affection for him. Furthermore, one change always leaves dentations upon which to build another,3 but in a long and continuous rule the recollection of changes and of their causes tends to be forgotten. Chapter 3 Mixed Principalities In a new principality, however, there are difficulties. To begin with, if it is not entirely new, but an added member so to speak (the old and the new together being called a mixed principality), changes of authority come about from a natural hazard which exists in all new principalities: that is, from the willingness of men to change one lord for another, believing thus to improve their lot. For this reason they take arms against their ruler; but in this they deceive themselves, for experience will prove that they will actually have worsened their lot. This in turn will be the result of another common and natural necessity, for by the presence of his soldiers and by those other innumerable offenses that follow upon conquest, the new ruler must inevitably distress those over whom he establishes his rule. So it happens that he makes enemies of all those whom he has injured in occupying the new principality, and yet he cannot keep the friendship of those who have set him up; for he cannot satisfy them as they had expected and, since he is obligated to them, he cannot use strong medicine against them. Even if one has a v